Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b37304e682b16587…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.23 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-08-22
MD5: 12f77fb3868cbbc35ae7d8422f186839 SHA-1: 810f8b0f16af4fd1babc31bea3d55dd1be7d7451 SHA-256: b37304e682b165879ee3d600e392eedced16f3baa65f1636b10187d29e2bf9f0
312 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204 User Execution T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a secondary PDF payload which, in turn, has a direct link to the URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com. The VBA macros are present but do not contain executable statements, suggesting they are not the primary execution vector. The PDF's structure indicates it is designed to evade parsers and deliver a payload.

Heuristics 9

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EBP) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EBP)
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
dbaeac9a34f3c6b67278f49f68820c941afe0f647b8eec2616505c13dd5d2331		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD000A6B9A/OlE10NAtIve 1417 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0005f200.pdf
6f57727159fed05a29f89b15414745f63566ac3ced7df0af1358081065166b62		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x5F200 894976 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
54028b75d139f438722cd8de279b5554905d04b37f04d176a093a2105cdd762e		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 1280512 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006400.pdf
d0c11bf1798c58a49fbea7cff4af34977cc4b00c14c9eecb2635f79f4dfd1b93		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6400 1259008 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00019000.pdf
53d58c8d5d423be5a68eda979fb01ccba867f1c1c6d23c86449a54b3df66fef6		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x19000 1182208 bytes

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