Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b35e5e26ee96199f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.42 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 89c388d72837e56693666a6cc64b5d5b SHA-1: 2893ca9ff9d6035949eacb8ba1ed5e10595cdcc6 SHA-256: b35e5e26ee96199fad283665d2ddf499dd177cd3234747759189e6eb45b6da2c
128 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File Execution T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

The critical heuristic firing for CVE_2017_0199 indicates the sample is designed to exploit a vulnerability to load a remote URL. The embedded PDF also shows suspicious static findings, suggesting a multi-stage attack. The sample likely acts as a downloader for a secondary payload.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
    URL https://nucleo.ooo/GKTHAb
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0006e200.pdf
539c48dfa3065da2e1ccbfa5359dc6ef8e5352858b4f7363b5bf993d24cb467f		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6E200 1038848 bytes

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