Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b32574be7df9e32f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

21.6 KB
MD5: a2ef2634b4086256396df008969c6616 SHA-1: b1fa36793258f192fa0dc7428b21aa9f8836c698 SHA-256: b32574be7df9e32fa959d697d4c65fd8e22c029d407a25693541a9e11121c5bc
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of ".objupdate" indicates that the embedded OLE object is designed to be automatically activated upon opening the document, leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting vulnerabilities to achieve arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000019cd.bin
fd144f06f52c362f07ca14c0c3884f5c0afb7a9b081d2488df423b777f3086aa
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x19CD 1417 bytes