Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b3231b2e90d76f30…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.0 KB Created: 2021-09-04 00:21:52 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: a75e8676cb5738b8775cff3e1deb4f7d SHA-1: fa65875693ea0e155414280dab8e96778997b2a7 SHA-256: b3231b2e90d76f308302cbec820361b23ab162d366dbcb03768f6fdebda6c4b4
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous links to external websites, many of which are hosted on compromised CMS platforms or disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to distribute malicious files. The presence of a 'download button' heuristic further supports a phishing or malware distribution attempt. ClamAV detection and ML classification confirm the malicious nature of the file.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9943

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.lindopoint.it/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e2164f73e276d892a13fd90bba86aca7/lebolawejox.pdf
    • https://aduanaldelvalle.com/userfiles/file/99802155076.pdf
    • http://szm.hu/userfiles/file/25155445851.pdf
    • https://dewalt-naradi.cz/media/upload/editor/file/59093596953.pdf
    • http://gsoam.ge/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160e8cff98b3de---togom.pdf
    • http://arabstina.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/vuwudanijidegijepuko.pdf
    • http://baihsad.com/userfiles/files/20210712_211648.pdf
    • http://zimaletto.com/uploads/file/komarovaronude.pdf
    • http://www.majorisinvestimentos.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607abf44b5375---39274738888.pdf
    • https://kawanmto.net/contents//files/90212478658.pdf
    • http://confidenzacsapagy.hu/upload/72556057410.pdf
    • https://senhewood.com/d/files/kufoz.pdf
    • http://dalboncostruzioni.it/userfiles/files/62566964311.pdf
    • http://aihyang.com/userfiles/file/noninitiwi.pdf
    • http://orhs86reunion.com/clients/6/67/6744625166a0df26c7abb40948833271/File/44940522189.pdf
    • http://www.rolstoellift.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16080f836b72b3---45387550583.pdf
    • http://lagunarent.lt/ckfinder/userfiles/files/40039564170.pdf
    • http://cyklo-sport-servis.cz/UserFiles/File/94393857087.pdf
    • http://schokofontaene.de/idata/47533036818.pdf
    • http://esoftland.com/userfiles/file/55155432940.pdf
    • http://www.sg-callenberg.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607b186474729---dozosefex.pdf
    • http://re-view.online/fckFiles/file/942716918.pdf
    • https://zhansq.cn/upload/file/liziferebemosama.pdf
    • http://cokhihoaiduc.com/uploads/files/88253690774.pdf
    • http://shosholoza.de/file/57030021475.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/LPIa9PGmDLg/uplcv?utm_term=asma+ul+husna+ki+fazilat+in+urdu+pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c564.bin
e4215cbec458bf41115e554e2816231d070849bda7c6a36c880280b595e25632
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC564 18532 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f58d.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF58D 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00010da4.bin
67333b49d8b1b221a9732958c3d6d79fd03160d71f911369d1bfa1db4f6609f3
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10DA4 10744 bytes