Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b31e497fb6bcbbb8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

52.4 KB Created: 2020-10-07 11:41:38 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: f5faf48a5720c5dcb59c55527390e8a0 SHA-1: 9c75c518fe373af9163e0f119594b1664ccaa4dc SHA-256: b31e497fb6bcbbb8abe0b8bfb986892516aab4863030bbd3536610d83570d920
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, with a critical heuristic identifying it as a malicious redirector link farm. Many of these links point to disposable hosting, indicating a likely SEO spam or phishing campaign. The ML classifier strongly supports the malicious nature of the document.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/pify?keyword=tascam+audio+interface+4x4 In PDF document text
    • http://jowuwujod.mfavela-nutrition.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383679/vanoriki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zagezegu.trueloveandcoffee.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453574/3943542.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rerolan.healingmission.org/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681361/6a7532.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vopato.barbaralcreations.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606636/gatobugafevuz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zazazurul.cwmdigitacollections.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739344/7f83f9dbca.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1040771.mozfiles.com/files/1040771/bajilulazuvezirot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037071.mozfiles.com/files/1037071/24854164685.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036921.mozfiles.com/files/1036921/71454349206.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3fbc68bd-3448-44fb-a4d2-f2741560082d/60574165048.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b154ecd7-0245-48f2-8c32-7a069e9b1a8e/sodosoxosapeb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0eb0e371-6171-4886-bbb6-563c52b5e4be/36163154200.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/fce39aee-9a79-4ec1-b0de-bd4e8d0a866b/gatulivu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0479/2628/0348/files/wedavitazivepagan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/8827/1767/files/puxonotuwanufomoduba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006b1f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6B1F 7380 bytes
SHA-256: ba45d9c630fdff75cc8fcac333ebb69cdd559637298a9dafe54a0d35bde5ffcf
font_01_sfnt_off000083cc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x83CC 5240 bytes
SHA-256: 1fbe87c002bc29bdeb6f518a92e855dd64ee90123e28ab457aa38eeb48fc1c0b
font_02_sfnt_off0000958c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x958C 15428 bytes
SHA-256: 9a4c08be9a0c301c364554a65e896cd7a51c2ea1286d9e6042e4405fc81a0919

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