Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b3104dab0a4fd156…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.24 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 71e541e756ee25fb690431d271d26e47 SHA-1: f7f6c91b2673d889035e3d542aa47c95130d9273 SHA-256: b3104dab0a4fd156fd26e66c494970ba11bc2e954b62d7bb23a618ae7519d1b9
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The file is an RTF document containing OLE object data and an embedded OLE object, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-8759). The ".objupdate" directive forces OLE activation, indicating an attempt to execute embedded code. This exploit pattern is commonly used to deliver secondary payloads.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0012a668.bin
02c538b5306112dfba933941c2aacc326d84073a0ec89d5d37b61eea5d92126b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x12A668 3732 bytes