MALICIOUS
66
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The PDF file is encrypted and contains JavaScript, which is a common technique to obfuscate malicious content. The presence of PDF_ENCRYPTED_WITH_JS and PDF_JAVASCRIPT heuristics indicates that the JavaScript is likely used to bypass static analysis and deliver a malicious payload. The PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE heuristic suggests the document may be designed to appear as a benign image-based document to deceive the user.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier clean score 0.0127
Heuristics 5
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Encrypted PDF carries /JS — payload hidden from static analysis high PDF_ENCRYPTED_WITH_JSPDF declares /Encrypt and also references an executable trigger (/JS). Document encryption hides the JavaScript body and stream contents from static scanners — combined with auto-execution indicators this is a known evasion pattern used to deliver weaponised JavaScript that the analyst cannot inspect without the decryption key.
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JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTONPDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
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PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LUREPDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
Extracted artifacts 4
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
javascript_obj0261_000.jsda8ef7339db8525f354cb03c11de39cf6cd5f178525e9cb38ea80f76d26c70bb |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 261 at offset 0x556D7 | 176 bytes |
javascript_obj0257_001.jsf5d12c89590445c26b62b46b2fdd8eb6a7947138b1b4877c1724311dca92bd14 |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 257 at offset 0x5589E | 64 bytes |
javascript_obj0255_002.js33ed036dba99a2aa0552172d30ced90246c52b3637376ec4ce549d86d1993a83 |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 255 at offset 0x559F5 | 64 bytes |
javascript_obj0253_003.js8c5bc2e50f285f593fddbced757b535f0fd9b2100908ccec9ca37ffd9986f461 |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 253 at offset 0x55B49 | 48 bytes |
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