Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b2b9f945e823de8e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

295.5 KB First seen: 2021-05-04
MD5: 3ae5587b15fa3a7391837bff4d7f0ff0 SHA-1: 1d608a470e2bf351df55b080e87d62ed918b2c8f SHA-256: b2b9f945e823de8e2cb68ff9b4834d1c3e179756b5a3775f4986b849bc79d914
340 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious File T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1137.001 Software Deployment Techniques: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with high-confidence heuristics indicating automatic linking and update triggers. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'download the document and click Enable Editing', which is a common lure for macro-based malware delivery. This suggests the embedded objects are designed to execute malicious code upon user interaction, likely to download and run a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 9

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • CVE-2017-0199 / CVE-2017-8759 (OLE2Link auto-activated remote loader) critical CVE related RTF_OLE2LINK_REMOTE_MONIKER_LOADER
    RTF embeds an OLE2Link object that is force-activated with \objupdate (no user interaction on open) and fetches a remote second stage — through an INCLUDETEXT/INCLUDEPICTURE field or the OLE object's own moniker. This is the OLE2Link auto-update attack path shared by CVE-2017-0199 (server returns an HTA/scriptlet) and CVE-2017-8759 (server returns a SOAP WSDL the .NET parser compiles). Office processes the fetched response through the same code path; the specific CVE depends on the now-unreachable server content type.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
🗂 Part of campaign: shared payload 3cd3b7d42e 51 samples

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000096e.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x96E 40500 bytes
SHA-256: a23d0e9cefaa16f1a5c49ee9d36fa1cd4e23b9c2b8b35d52305c4470bd43d072
objdata_01_off0000711d.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x711D 40473 bytes
SHA-256: 3a66685d9fe6b4dbff541f23d629f6723fa5fe21afe1456bfe249cba7065cc51
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): WScript.Shell"")")
objdata_02_off0001ba96.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1BA96 2632 bytes
SHA-256: 3cd3b7d42e5855c90d6d11c54ef2670ed8970441480cc23f7d39ef08fa1c935b
objdata_03_off0001d039.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D039 12297 bytes
SHA-256: e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7

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