RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · b2b9f945e823de8e

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

295.5 KB

MD5: 3ae5587b15fa3a7391837bff4d7f0ff0 SHA-1: 1d608a470e2bf351df55b080e87d62ed918b2c8f SHA-256: b2b9f945e823de8e2cb68ff9b4834d1c3e179756b5a3775f4986b849bc79d914

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious File T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1137.001 Software Deployment Techniques: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with high-confidence heuristics indicating automatic linking and update triggers. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'download the document and click Enable Editing', which is a common lure for macro-based malware delivery. This suggests the embedded objects are designed to execute malicious code upon user interaction, likely to download and run a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000096e.bin` `a23d0e9cefaa16f1a5c49ee9d36fa1cd4e23b9c2b8b35d52305c4470bd43d072`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x96E	40500 bytes
`objdata_01_off0000711d.bin` `3a66685d9fe6b4dbff541f23d629f6723fa5fe21afe1456bfe249cba7065cc51`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x711D	40473 bytes
`objdata_02_off0001ba96.bin` `3cd3b7d42e5855c90d6d11c54ef2670ed8970441480cc23f7d39ef08fa1c935b`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1BA96	2632 bytes
`objdata_03_off0001d039.bin` `e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D039	12297 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.