Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b2b80b62ded0d6f1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.3 KB Created: 2020-08-05 04:46:58 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 9d8ffdedb5e583f369a86101787e868d SHA-1: b154eca4a491759a34439c09c4926ccaed632673 SHA-256: b2b80b62ded0d6f1cb38edc9b7531e66a515647706e1ad0abef21e49a354aefd
150 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains a mass of external links, with one specifically pointing to a known malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the same URL as the malicious redirector, suggesting a lure to trick users into clicking through to malicious infrastructure. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=origami+butterfly+ball+instructions+pdf
    • http://files.techniquejobs.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406816/2390231.pdf
    • http://files.duepiunews.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383764/c0ca5.pdf
    • http://nukamobak.rasacacorporation.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606201/b431a9.pdf
    • http://xavogit.languagelearningforchildren.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872225/fexozetumibe-jegifa-dezurogoze.pdf
    • http://xizunibi.monika-schnitzer.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695818/0085b2bd508.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9763/7535/files/topinuxolobo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/21096031872.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/5386/6408/files/etiologia_de_la_diabetes_mellitus_tipo_2.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/8517/5713/files/53015910177.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/6740/0601/files/96755738916.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/wogol.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/6033/9623/files/wobetefawadidinemozaz.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/0511/6575/files/57457166961.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/0425/4615/files/how_to_open_mp_file.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/1165/4307/files/fewinemu.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004ca1.bin
c80899b8be1b4ba321a2708d6c23fd39d26052300a490e8f03d33fcd5d921a93		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4CA1 5624 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00005fa9.bin
3e9ddb5517b3f5024847edc8a5870c93c1db06279e8f17c1a3e057a196d99ec3		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5FA9 10088 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000821b.bin
1062cd8ddf90f4344fa193b395386d5669df1a952e5759311ca261a71931f361		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x821B 4324 bytes

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