Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b2a45b802e855c0b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.3 KB
MD5: d07a8c686032f858066beef82d067ad3 SHA-1: 16400783438b6be725627532f00f8c77f3181173 SHA-256: b2a45b802e855c0bc4a30a62110e1e32077a65acb6277c6ff968986a7b5290e4
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED heuristics indicates that the file is designed to exploit this known vulnerability for code execution. The ".objupdate" directive further suggests that the embedded object is intended to be activated automatically upon opening the document.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000e4.bin
a52c249a498899514482bbf00b1b706449698305b65e89f025711f963ba537ec		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE4 1988 bytes

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