Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b28d77be185f0a62…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

88.5 KB Created: 1996-12-17 01:32:42 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 57426b70ce92ddfc44bd4d6b6cfe7c1b SHA-1: 51250c868ce586bd18522252da4eede85e6fd955 SHA-256: b28d77be185f0a62263f6cf67b9c5773b5b635a331a487c67088637643b11218
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an OLE document that exhibits high-severity heuristic firings indicating the use of WinExec, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress APIs. Additionally, it contains XOR-encoded strings with a key of 0x03, suggesting an attempt to hide malicious code or commands. The large slack space in the OLE structure is also anomalous. These indicators point towards an attempt to execute arbitrary code, but without further script or body content, the specific payload and delivery mechanism remain unclear.

Heuristics 5

  • XOR-encoded strings (key 0x03) critical SC_XOR_ENCODED
    Found 8 Windows library/API name(s) XOR-encoded with single-byte key 0x03: 'VirtualAlloc', 'VirtualAlloc', 'VirtualAllocEx', 'VirtualProtect', 'VirtualProtectEx', 'CreateProcessA', 'WriteProcessMemory', 'ReadProcessMemory'
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 90,624 bytes but its declared streams total only 24,565 bytes — 66,059 bytes (73%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).

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