Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b24fc3474bb59d6c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.4 KB Created: 2020-11-05 21:35:15 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-26
MD5: 591053a349757921b5e70824886543df SHA-1: 1253e071f64277d6578c2edd3212b6dcaccdec0a SHA-256: b24fc3474bb59d6c44bfa9c4b80859a38025e7343b30c9b6bbf62e70ae556904
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. Heuristics indicate lures for browser extension installation and callback phishing, common social engineering tactics. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, supporting the assessment of a malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 7

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffset.ru/123?keyword=coupon+bath+and+body+works+2020 PDF link annotation
    • https://dikoriwapajok.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134447187/dupetekeji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365638/normal_5f86f4118e992.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wemibevufiwoseb.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813314/e8797d077a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://polabufasol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814050/xibifobamenotexijef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xumogimunosu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607683/4022689.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zakiguranul.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134480990/776067fc73.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://runebipunozup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406604/sevuvevimuferijobaxo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/warapagefasovi/49227321470.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/87af94fb-0178-4a7e-b49b-606451d9b044/lofekivozuzekazikebot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e3856871-de14-4b47-b463-34b6c7f064f4/vexovotuvimu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006366.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6366 5592 bytes
SHA-256: ed2e107cd62d7a96ccbffa5c02103524cca81416fd275abca787aeeac5f439ca
font_01_sfnt_off0000766b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x766B 11264 bytes
SHA-256: a76015ac9b580b981176d65f263f41023ef6d6cb5e952418c5a7cc2d6a65e584

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.