Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b23e8a62cbbba0a1…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

182.5 KB
MD5: fc8f42169a41b7b9952997029c78bc32 SHA-1: 6c9ea5798f6171d71e4ef21892c79be493fce3b9 SHA-256: b23e8a62cbbba0a10a5e3b3d1ae4eb82bea2e09707f4162bc353b2cf086f592a
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1059.001 PowerShell T1218 Signed Binary Proxy Execution

The sample exhibits high-confidence heuristics indicating the use of ShellExecute, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress APIs, suggesting dynamic code loading and execution. A significant portion of the OLE document's data is slack space, which can be used to hide malicious content. Crucially, the document contains a 'Clipboard command execution lure,' instructing the user to paste content into a shell, which is a common social engineering tactic to bypass security controls and execute arbitrary commands. No specific malware family could be identified.

Heuristics 6

  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 186,880 bytes but its declared streams total only 56,346 bytes — 130,534 bytes (70%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.microsoft.com
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa
    • http://ocsp.verisign.com/ocsp/status0
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA.crl0
    • http://www.nirsoft.net/

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