Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b22b5066b4edef5b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.8 KB Created: 2021-02-15 06:11:52 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-07-02
MD5: 456021cc0f1a379e7260dec17ff2b0d3 SHA-1: 6ade8e98dacd3094d2c7a2188b26529add31d8bf SHA-256: b22b5066b4edef5ba7d04cfd13779bbe5cd01590b094e4c7606ae446df292f25
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, with at least one pointing to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains metadata suggesting it was generated by wkhtmltopdf, and the presence of many links on disposable hosting points towards a link farm used for phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://crophysi.ru/aws?utm_term=black+american+movies+2016 In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/tovisegag/2LrpZig/twister_game_board.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bunnygummy.ru/7239291097031q4e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nakrutkavk.site/4988447361853wdf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://grampus-shop.com/move_spotify_music_to_sd_card_androiduemhr.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zisujidixa/f90hamR/74710171789.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://piramejujidizek.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134694247/03ba72796c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jupedozezuwobig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134040413/buwitogemadub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jifofavara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134631997/6706423.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://biggymstoe.com/blackpink_all_songs_in_englishycub9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tejalegevususo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637178/1726212.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://subozabi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710736/funobozodoserulox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/takurugilij/capra_cu_trei_iezi_ion_creanga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gedesopow.rf.gd/reacciones_acido_base.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lovomijelun/virginia_croaker_fishing_report.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jubiferekaka/jumutabilezik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tosevud/pavakoxiwunadexo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xijilesuzuxo/80950766276.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000def3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDEF3 5600 bytes
SHA-256: fdaccf37d94e011fe06a2e9beaa600fa80fbbb66a1ea4b4007ea9a3621b5ca3b
font_01_sfnt_off0000f1f3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF1F3 10720 bytes
SHA-256: cbdef172c5e12782856565e5c5b688ce4e6df2279db8fd87a2d0881450eee4f2

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