Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b21004d21247037e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

29.9 KB First seen: 2022-12-12
MD5: af794e7696aa77d946f52827343c436d SHA-1: 78cc9e5f9f9f3e55dc6753eb92392b38cc39f77d SHA-256: b21004d21247037ef7df178d3b5912fb5b23c9355b34814b96618cfb79607bac
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic indicates the document instructs the user to enable editing, likely to trigger the exploit. No scripts were extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000041bc.bin
00e99d6cadeaa5fe87d9300048acdfb42b769020478370e07bbe4e8cccbbccd6
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x41BC 1940 bytes