Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b2083dd157851443…

MALICIOUS

RTF

314.6 KB Created: 2019-01-07 23:54:00 First seen: 2020-05-25
MD5: 889ff85370bb381d66ad68c474f9dfcb SHA-1: 05bdb15410caa6d2e3ef6da9a7a3796742e65dec SHA-256: b2083dd157851443cbe53ffd74fe2303b55d2b3f8146effa7514cadada0c2f1e
122 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains multiple OLE object embeddings, with specific rules indicating the presence of package objects and an \objupdate command designed to force OLE activation. This suggests the file is designed to exploit vulnerabilities within OLE object handling to execute arbitrary code. The embedded object file 'objdata_00_off00000b2c.bin' is the primary artifact of interest.

Heuristics 5

  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Package object class high RTF_OBJCLASS_PACKAGE
    OLE Package object — can wrap arbitrary files
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000a80.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA80 47150 bytes
SHA-256: 78ed7172c02674d590cf0b0c8465d7bf20b92c14e3526e1777018cb7e57967cc