Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b1f76b56b1940f17…

MALICIOUS

PDF

64.9 KB Created: 2021-01-01 06:34:35 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: 55d25c94426a5d7513bf1c05548c7e5e SHA-1: fdfc324f9bbde0d0220fd55a2341f4f88084e4da SHA-256: b1f76b56b1940f17eccde4e453744124de62834810ec9c843e97adeb0c433713
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to known malicious redirectors or disposable hosting. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains keywords like 'white mermaid dress plus size' which appear to be used as lures to disguise the malicious nature of the links. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/123?utm_term=white+mermaid+dress+plus+size In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/waderapal/hiKih7d/snapple_flavors_of_the_90s.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://texelepetorabaj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134738155/kawizizupowokan_vuwulepomari_zexupero.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wafulezejo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134748518/ab7a9222b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://niramividaro.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134517418/3af7a6f06b581f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mepifinifiwiza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134334375/1388298.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fopezifu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134717551/lulogu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zitewamim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454986/mojugubo_ninezevaji_bawavisejole_giwulu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bexenexitefixu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134725849/sejumeronarabiluxe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/dukapudubi/HHhaxcN/marco_polo_pizza_number.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kesevaze.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383297/vepozi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/dudigonifu/kuketuzadejakevimejatiz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4dd3df27-c4ea-43e4-a2e6-9f5602531b06/anime_girl_wallpaper_iphone_6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/fcb45c65-337d-460c-832e-8c460db82b9c/bosch_router_guide_bushing_plate.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/89baea22-8fbe-41c3-b908-b43d43038ad9/96602423232.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/36c017b6-e293-44fe-88a7-91f9d94baebc/xakufilus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b878.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB878 4928 bytes
SHA-256: e40591bbc7e6c42af92336e7e189669a92fd87cc950db88eb7a5c3c2e898fa55
font_01_sfnt_off0000c93c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC93C 9200 bytes
SHA-256: 1d7427964fdab1bfa6b37d4403a5b9902c9600263621dceb61aa244f8b05f187
font_02_sfnt_off0000e8b9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE8B9 4324 bytes
SHA-256: ff5f0ef16caf3e97cd1984b3a03ea88e11eab8cf63d2ee006085a4b9995833f3

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