Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b1c54ce8e72d1ae9…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.0 KB
MD5: 5c468afaba2d6c9eea555d6c894c073e SHA-1: c0a5d472709c50426b658a193e6052c717a38ff7 SHA-256: b1c54ce8e72d1ae929449cf53c22be6d2e1c80f19ce756c9ebeb6f0d649f390e
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting Microsoft Equation Editor. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJAUTLINK` heuristics indicates an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability, likely CVE-2017-11882, to achieve code execution. The `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristic further suggests that the embedded object is designed to be automatically activated upon opening the document, leading to the execution of a malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000a4.bin
3bef5fc222fd87a439179cc339334ae04534c57fa594dd3d48238a0d804c1673
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA4 1767 bytes