Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b1c176b90b0da876…

MALICIOUS

RTF

5.6 KB First seen: 2018-03-04
MD5: c1854a10db21f9b94bc2c3dd5a98b49f SHA-1: 73528832b0ed3a680bd2853553157c80f8a54e8c SHA-256: b1c176b90b0da876cfbf572bd54526977cbe3369d5162d1f3368869b484747de
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains an OLE object that is automatically linked and updated, indicating an attempt to exploit a vulnerability. Specifically, the CVE-2017-0199 heuristic fired, pointing to a remote URL that is likely used to download and execute a secondary payload. The ClamAV detection further confirms the exploit. The embedded URL http://kali.dev/tiktak.com is therefore a high-priority IOC.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-0199 (OLE2Link / remote URL Moniker) critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    RTF contains a URL Moniker OLE link whose decoded target is remote. Office can fetch and process the response through the CVE-2017-0199 OLE2Link attack path, but the server-side content type is not proven statically.
  • ClamAV: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2017_0199-6335035-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2017_0199-6335035-0
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://kali.dev/tiktak.com In RTF body
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordmlIn RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000001a2.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1A2 2601 bytes
SHA-256: b526a73fdd2d86a67637b02ce97b25bc80fa413cadfec72e61c98b07dd7c9e28