Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b1af298cf6be57fd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

57.9 KB Created: 2020-11-09 07:15:37 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: bf0b766f9706fa888e264ad4292b5dea SHA-1: 53943ed82fc00df5876141677cd83df814257bcd SHA-256: b1af298cf6be57fd57aadb4a46a85d6eb880a1c487da05c375cfe07311d4f231
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF document contains numerous external links, masquerading as an answer key to lure users to malicious websites. The PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic indicates a large number of these links, suggesting a link farm or SEO poisoning tactic. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafffe.ru/123?keyword=gizmo+student+exploration+osmosis+answer+key
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4416665/normal_5f99a6edbe99c.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4419623/normal_5f9e7e41e832e.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4414334/normal_5f9b41b10c34f.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4376362/normal_5fa51a90afb23.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4408993/normal_5fa12eb994cfc.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://zoniwika.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/zezinejivapigewuxus.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zabevog/69177442919.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bopuxosavubare/dbq_vietnam_war_answer_key.pdf
    • https://tinomev.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/reteje_compaero_mason.pdf
    • https://rebozowenopo.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/xibosud.pdf
    • https://jodivikubo.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/cours_anglais_grammaire_conjugaison.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000099db.bin
9338e84ef7049de4c3d530acd0b1f3be978d0345179f558c4374935ac57ec6cd
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x99DB 5512 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000acb0.bin
1d1472c0cad841c361a1e04404006acb3be6851b80a82b57eca58a7c9ceccb5f
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xACB0 16572 bytes