Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b198277cbe959cc8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.5 KB Created: 2020-04-09 23:28:40 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.1.4 (via Qt 4.8.6)
MD5: 2ca5dde5e781f72f84e8ace5da913b58 SHA-1: 005e74a96f24900613be80cd6a452f776e6bf47c SHA-256: b198277cbe959cc84365e657fa8d2e934f5db49b4a5afceaf2a6165d928f0d19
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of external links to other PDF files hosted on various domains, as indicated by the PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic. The ML classifier also flagged this PDF as malicious with high confidence. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains references to URLs that are part of this link farm. The primary attack pattern appears to be a link farm designed to manipulate search engine results or distribute malicious content through numerous external links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://brynnviar.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814863/130814863.html#grown+ups+3+imdb
    • http://staraurora.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130289270/8332480.pdf
    • http://hitz-treuhand.ch/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383380/kosene.pdf
    • http://carmela-jo-designs.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776449/ca78fb556243.pdf
    • http://estebanshat.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437092/55243.pdf
    • http://hairbydwoo.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130622038/vumavemenexawobisa.pdf
    • http://gotaxed.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407061/2245934.pdf
    • http://thenaturalway.shop/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384602/033b635631.pdf
    • http://8thstreetgirlsphotographyllc.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775434/vafodapoponibuvifas.pdf
    • http://wilarksporthorses.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130603887/4931cefef8b762e.pdf
    • http://dmtartistryllc.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776197/tuvegupiwo.pdf
    • http://blackwatertradegroup.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398253/2086142.pdf
    • http://getawaymiles.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130436033/cd474.pdf
    • http://iss-energy.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383242/terivo_zulasafemer.pdf
    • http://cprtrainingconcepts.com/uploads/1/3/0/3/130313192/8555439.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00008173.bin
c43d7a2eb196de6324653e72422e1e03bd2c18c0e352df7bdca954d362390f8e
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8173 8176 bytes