Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b183f7d3dea5f3bb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

143.8 KB Created: 2020-04-22 10:41:20 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.1.4 (via Qt 4.8.6)
MD5: f59da464d8de95cf156e0268910e5056 SHA-1: b32a46a97c071bb7549cebc62502559c6059ec8b SHA-256: b183f7d3dea5f3bb89c7950875c1da65c661f38f54cf94abacf40a6f5781b7fa
94 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many of which point to similarly structured URLs on different domains. This suggests a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness. While no scripts were extracted, the sheer volume of outbound links and the ML score suggest a malicious intent, possibly to redirect users to phishing or malware-hosting sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://fischercf.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969329/130969329.html#answered+by+fire+cast
    • http://tumekiadaniels.net/uploads/1/3/0/2/130272339/mugetaxoxusuru_wakizabex.pdf
    • http://danykenny.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380825/woxamakexoba_divusitibige_zugalum.pdf
    • http://otrdriverrecruiters.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776114/0b5ec9.pdf
    • http://ellensburgduilawyer.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130543032/fugidibe.pdf
    • http://healingher.co/uploads/1/3/0/5/130547771/6831339.pdf
    • http://thenflgroup.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130288720/1460835.pdf
    • http://onechanceoneplanet.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379856/fekemuganisinano.pdf
    • http://wolfinside.net/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740145/zetete_wekipizi_tugipiko.pdf
    • http://rpmosiertherapy.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130589095/2921531.pdf
    • http://forkliftprotraining.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130604192/d18d097cbe65.pdf
    • http://nuvisionconstructionservices.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130483341/mudanelefaran.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000211d6.bin
c8337b01cb380e96f01f0c32efe4a5abff0f946580e589391897e9947276f30a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x211D6 8464 bytes

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