Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b17a176d7398ffb6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

46.8 KB Created: 2020-10-04 20:06:13 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: 8528f6744ba084741eca4aa27c8d74c7 SHA-1: d1d16dd7a92f0528e4acef05b825e329cbe9d692 SHA-256: b17a176d7398ffb685beadb77b5c88d7f9407105aee45184262bafededae77e6
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a deceptive lure, presenting itself as a free download for a textbook, but actually redirects users to a link farm. This link farm hosts numerous other PDF files, likely to distribute malware or facilitate further phishing attempts. The ML classifier strongly indicates malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.link/pify?keyword=fundamentals+of+modern+manufacturing+6th+edition+pdf+free+download In PDF document text
    • http://patitomu.thewell-seasonedwoman.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437462/xovelatib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://desenigor.quiltingshanty.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740285/8166132.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.claremccallan.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739363/bogeke.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.leahrempelphotography.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776508/d6bd5c830ed5da.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rebil.kuangstudio.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969432/8664286.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.jennifergrayolson.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775822/lezufexezivaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.douglasislandbiblechurch.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814056/netajaxegozorowa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://narawi.mackprichard.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814930/burazebiv-jepowurovisizub-pikobopalo-bewegepawojado.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nedep.compliancemastersllc.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132683008/xajiterikorabof-sodupekosusax-gofagozoxuba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lavasisib.powerinpresence.net/uploads/1/3/1/0/131069891/nidokizibi_ketok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5759/4011/files/52355662892.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/9526/1333/files/the_macra_terror_dvd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005e83.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5E83 5768 bytes
SHA-256: d4ae5bbf70db3a6d2f8fb9c749cbe37e3a5258260fcb319867441c0da539c8d8
font_01_sfnt_off0000720c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x720C 2116 bytes
SHA-256: 89454d8ece1be00d2333aac76955f46ed17c4d141322e635bf27f42efb43e54e
font_02_sfnt_off00007bd8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7BD8 15408 bytes
SHA-256: ddb46ea7c25b5cfe9a0f34d920f08f0305e9339cba67a5630490d3ac5ff33abb

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