Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b13fa6dc419d2c05…

MALICIOUS

PDF

93.7 KB Created: ¥Ý+R«œðMÚp±Ú`§IÒ¼“› Authoring application: ­UT½4“¶F0vÂڅБu.}|>L”`­ì¬Â½ (via ɝtþØé8ƒG6ì†8öØYÖµ“”BΧ>e'P) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: cb1d443676c97a83344c6edcb49da537 SHA-1: d56b353eeb80686ed961216001b5cdcac6a0649d SHA-256: b13fa6dc419d2c05a87df4a1fcb417c36cb7c5402e05998e9e6581320fd309d3
582 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file exploits CVE-2010-1240 to execute cmd.exe, which then attempts to launch an embedded executable disguised as 'Report.pdf'. The embedded JavaScript API 'this.exportDataObject' is used to facilitate the dropping and execution of the payload. The extracted artifact 'Report.pdf' was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Swrort-9886728-0.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9983

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\Report.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Encrypted PDF carries /JavaScript — payload hidden from static analysis high PDF_ENCRYPTED_WITH_JS
    PDF declares /Encrypt and also references an executable trigger (/JavaScript). Document encryption hides the JavaScript body and stream contents from static scanners — combined with auto-execution indicators this is a known evasion pattern used to deliver weaponised JavaScript that the analyst cannot inspect without the decryption key.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Optional Content Group with action trigger low PDF_OPTIONAL_CONTENT
    Optional Content Group (layer) co-occurs with an action trigger — content can be selectively hidden from viewers or scanners while the action still fires on open

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
Report.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 37 at offset 0x2DE3 37888 bytes
SHA-256: 5124a034fe30f96cfa22c6b6a6b6707b50f57ef49385d93dd836e21294f5679c
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-9886728-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=Report.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0006_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 6 at offset 0x13C6 55 bytes
SHA-256: ddae86274602ebcd16a9bdd1e7f0aae016e1337d7867313b8ce221ca79ec2d82
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "Report", nLaunch: 0 });