RTF malware analysis — malicious · b13ad44ebdbdc530

MALICIOUS

RTF

24.1 KB First seen: 2022-11-13

MD5: 004ebc625831cb1f9d1ee2fa23a526e1 SHA-1: 3fda3f2ec1ded09f1e5531ea49a82a7c49236dbb SHA-256: b13ad44ebdbdc53068e26d7aa84805bc1a4550a37c750ed726aee47cd692bb7a

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic confirms the document instructs the user to enable editing, a common social engineering tactic to bypass security measures and trigger the exploit. The RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristic further suggests that the object is configured to activate automatically upon opening.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00004dc6.bin` `dda973fbbdc3cbec61fb4ae5d961b633b7ffaa68e5002164438e5fcc0b943943`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x4DC6	1324 bytes

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