Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b11e2d45a67d73ef…

MALICIOUS

PDF

34.3 KB Created: 2020-11-06 03:08:07 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-01-11
MD5: 06edfbc82965206e746fc812293c9d4b SHA-1: 4f05ce9fa6ce627ecb24a9a1583ab19e9f9085eb SHA-256: b11e2d45a67d73ef33d7ab7b692ef90f3c9ea528f971f8daa0f00c1f30f27039
124 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffine.ru/aws?keyword=kentish+fire+gainesville+va In PDF document text
    • https://ligofaxudatejot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739538/kimilenivitekoze.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zosupexaduj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738593/be3704f20.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wotigutaz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134361511/118757.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jiwepurojal.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775762/zeretokexomaxepimop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rogusedi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134433103/300fc5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zilavexeredora.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874610/pimut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xotuwajugi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134349857/fokoz_kenajedagimabe_kikevakerujef_sononud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mosovokiz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134333023/fugozadiduvop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lorifumofelu/penuropekekiz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0484/2831/8877/files/convert_base64_to_in_swift_4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e2fdb0f9-4995-4819-81c1-3c9454eaa397/niwomeluliwur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/felasorarabipis/mozal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004722.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4722 5060 bytes
SHA-256: 3368e76259cc6b246c031f7cbe3fb8eb87e24e510b23a1f5ba06f232e57b81ca
font_01_sfnt_off00005866.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5866 10628 bytes
SHA-256: 7ab46896dbc6f64d2a447e392dae12a18685f9c3e8c4c3c13ab00977429e0bf4

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.