Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b0cfd511498cbaed…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

26.0 KB Created: 2022-06-03 10:03:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2022-08-17
MD5: 98998af843c2c938c079a102abe6c73d SHA-1: b1a1dda90b3df0ba5f23430a6c55c48a9c3dbe9d SHA-256: b0cfd511498cbaed084fa622cfeb1a07de7478205cbff58cb40cb89091813593
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious File

The sample leverages known vulnerabilities, CVE-2017-0199 and CVE-2022-30190 (Follina), through an embedded OLE object. This object is configured to fetch and execute a payload from the URL https://dullghostwhitetwintext.karewen.repl.co/index.html. ClamAV detection further confirms the malicious nature of the file, specifically identifying it as an exploit related to CVE-2022-30190.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2022-30190 — Follina stage-1 external HTML oleObject critical CVE likely CVE_2022_30190
    External OLEObject relationship targets a remote .html with the Follina delivery shape (oleObject -> HTTP(S) HTML with trailing Moniker '!'). In live Follina samples the ms-msdt: trigger is served by the remote HTML, not the document itself.
  • OOXML OLE2Link remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 related high CVE related CVE_2017_0199_RELATED
    Document contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship points to a remote URL. This is the OOXML OLE2Link activation shape associated with CVE-2017-0199 delivery, but the local file does not expose URL Moniker bytes or a weaponized extension/content type, so the exact CVE cannot be proven statically.
  • ClamAV: Win.Exploit.CVE_2022_30190-9951234-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Exploit.CVE_2022_30190-9951234-1
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2019/extlst
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahash
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • https://dullghostwhitetwintext.karewen.repl.co/index.html

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
4313f953567b3178957cb5675af6a3f6ae2dabd2258d52276b9602287d1b1e18		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 2271232 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
df8750988298487457d0022b89317ebc0726139baf0cf8da5f1bbba16a806581		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 2240124 bytes
emf_00.emf
8acc7cbe7beb283d3908f418fb5390623f1eb46018f426d4911f5515e786caa5		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 10172 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.