Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b0b6f157d6b95282…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

290.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-05-08
MD5: 24c99a73330918cfc924656bd23907a8 SHA-1: 568864dfda3dadf64cee58b9f6ef130e08fe9fe3 SHA-256: b0b6f157d6b952826b3f20ace4d1da4c28d4e1fb5a29bfdeb641f8bc3651504d
112 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing indicates exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object, which attempts to load a remote resource from the URL http://23.94.206.76/d/QQQQ%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23qqq.doc. The embedded PDF also contains suspicious findings, suggesting it may be part of the secondary payload. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the presence of the OLE link and embedded PDF strongly suggests a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://23.94.206.76/d/QQQQ%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23qqq.doc

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00011400.pdf
3dd18d1d0588dae9ecffe9a19170ba01f33630c8113521a4be801a5010c36aa0		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x11400 226304 bytes

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