Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b093ff4f23d1ddf7…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.98 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: c06f5c6162635b656ccf8ad49b7611aa SHA-1: 9e863455ce255b42e1ed61aaeb7e43ccc4a84c4a SHA-256: b093ff4f23d1ddf7b456a1216e97676885b2df2db20d239a2f23a3ec77bfbdb4
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, which is a known vector for exploiting vulnerabilities. Specifically, the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_8759 heuristics indicate the exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, a vulnerability in MSXML that allows for remote code execution when a malicious OLE object is activated. The objupdate directive further suggests that the object is designed to be automatically activated upon opening the document, leading to the execution of arbitrary code.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off002ebed9.bin
d1da66ba723e8208ce17367a0ae2e5f1be424f0e5769f786684c32b15ac7a68e		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2EBED9 3732 bytes

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