Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b08628fcc8e703e3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

7.6 KB
MD5: 61f712b74d65f4337762f81906addda3 SHA-1: 3083351eea8b47bbc76e1b1ea5ea08c66c25cb6c SHA-256: b08628fcc8e703e3b4cf509b87acc697bc9cf35700599ff4389e3f4a280855c5
346 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 JavaScript/JScript T1204.001 Malicious Link/URL T1204.002 Malicious File

This PDF file contains multiple critical heuristic firings indicating exploitation of Adobe Reader vulnerabilities, specifically CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2007-5659, and CVE-2008-2992. The embedded JavaScript, which is heavily obfuscated and decoded, is designed to leverage these exploits. The primary function appears to be the execution of a second-stage payload, as suggested by the ClamAV detection of Js.Exploit.Shellcode-18 on an extracted artifact.

Heuristics 10

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • OpenAction trigger high PDF_OPENACTION
    PDF has an /OpenAction — code runs automatically when opened
  • eval() call high PDF_EVAL
    eval() found — commonly used for obfuscated exploit execution (matched inside decoded stream)
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • String.fromCharCode low PDF_FROMCHARCODE
    String.fromCharCode found — used to construct payload strings dynamically. Common in benign JavaScript libraries for codepoint manipulation, so this alone is informational; weaponised use is also caught by the dedicated fromCharCode-stage and exploit-shape rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0009_000.js
a11aa538140489e0072c4876eefebc586b895689bc7d5afb35882b9280b42902
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0xD6 19560 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
custom_b64_stage_000.js
d30fe075b45a91dc7757602b5b1cd7e825f489f64b1ef62aeeb75f3ca9252fe8
deobfuscated-js custom Base64 decoded JavaScript layer 2 (PDF /JS object 9) at offset 0x450 10478 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Js.Exploit.Shellcode-18
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 9 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).