Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 — Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b082c40d46fd7f4b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.50 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-08-24
MD5: ea3bc19f101f285bdfaf32d1c12f1649 SHA-1: e848d66c20795717099f35486fa09fa64c3d892a SHA-256: b082c40d46fd7f4b6b2c67e7a85900a4ef664cbde82d339aad167d6604a83283
272 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The file is detected as malicious by ClamAV and exhibits critical heuristic findings related to embedded PDF payloads and direct payload links. The embedded PDF contains a suspicious URL that likely serves as a download source for a second-stage payload. The presence of an Equation Editor OLE object further suggests a technique to bypass security controls and deliver malicious content.

Heuristics 8

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0005c200.pdf
686c0617a7b04e042525a8c83503df9fdf780cc44c52b8eeb1e763d67ea6545f		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x5C200 1198080 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
fd3bb5d8e025310b98db3ed8b9097de397ed2147f77bdbb1ad49254015e6e596		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 1570816 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006600.pdf
66b3080d68d645afbc674d97a730d8e4cc5aa1a9316b33bee34bdfd2b7764ce9		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6600 1549312 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00019000.pdf
7ddb212a7a91b6910e2be221cd201d39d090f0a6a0ed8c6bc9f56502b991d1c3		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x19000 1473024 bytes

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