RTF malware analysis — malicious · b0769d3bdce7d311

MALICIOUS

RTF

80.1 KB First seen: 2024-09-22

MD5: 0f700130bb0477a08b0160b460ee0980 SHA-1: 49aa847f3a5baed6563c0ad06991cf5345a4fb5d SHA-256: b0769d3bdce7d31131113f0afe08575dafaa2f4b0b542eb401d2eefe8c4a26a7

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains critical heuristics indicating the exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR). It also fires for OLE object data (RTF_OBJDATA), automatic linking (RTF_OBJAUTLINK), and forced OLE activation (RTF_OBJUPDATE), all pointing towards a malicious OLE object embedded within the document. This strongly suggests the file is designed to exploit this vulnerability to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001aab.bin` `4683f45ae7fb6c4690bcbc2398cfa912f576c571211dc3ae3b36042c2934492b`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1AAB	1580 bytes

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