Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b07523908e634bda…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

128.5 KB Created: 2009-05-15 02:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 9.0
MD5: 98cb67eb395a892703c0fb4d97598660 SHA-1: a9025c8a33761cfd4c2d8b8a7104161ab50cf889 SHA-256: b07523908e634bda551d65ab6f73521c55eec1d64f7de254afdd81ca9d8448a6
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The OLE document exhibits a large slack space and appended executable-looking payload, strongly suggesting it's a dropper. The inability to extract VBA macros due to an unsupported format further supports the possibility of obfuscation or a legacy/malformed structure designed to evade analysis. The appended payload is the primary indicator of malicious intent.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 131,584 bytes but its declared streams total only 16,486 bytes — 115,098 bytes (87%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.