Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b06f698ba7de7d33…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

626.1 KB
MD5: 6bb989c4decfd36e941eae8dfe9ebbc1 SHA-1: f074403f9da141427163f5787b790c2dfc29e240 SHA-256: b06f698ba7de7d33252ea0b188433d8204d539f09009f9760af30b7884fe331d
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The OOXML document utilizes an altChunk to import an external RTF file named 'Kyrgyzstan.rtf'. This RTF file contains OLE objects that are triggered for activation using the \objupdate directive. The presence of excessive hex data within these OLE objects suggests the embedded RTF is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely leading to a second-stage payload download or execution.

Heuristics 6

  • altChunk imports embedded RTF (RTF injection) critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF
    Document inlines an embedded RTF via an aFChunk relationship and a <w:altChunk> body element. This is the canonical RTF-injection wrapper used to smuggle RTF exploits (Equation Editor / URL Moniker / objdata) past DOCX-only scanners. Word opens the wrapper and executes the RTF inline. Recursing into the RTF for the exact exploit primitive.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    (in altChunk RTF word/Kyrgyzstan.rtf) RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    (in altChunk RTF word/Kyrgyzstan.rtf) RTF contains ~2826KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    (in altChunk RTF word/Kyrgyzstan.rtf) RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    (in altChunk RTF word/Kyrgyzstan.rtf) RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://opendope.org/xpaths
    • http://opendope.org/conditions
    • http://opendope.org/questions
    • http://opendope.org/components
    • http://opendope.org/SmartArt/DataHierarchy
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/schemaLibrary/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chart
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chartDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/diagram
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/picture
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/spreadsheetDrawing
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2008/diagram
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/compatibility
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/lockedCanvas

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003a12.bin
9dc4f3635d694d98d136d5dce098ee3f61a6f914dc3ca036920a30dadc40619e		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3A12 1425749 bytes
objdata_01_off002c6d0f.bin
cfdb4a077c5f246e92e6322395cebc5a3dcf8a28c92ec8882aadb5231c9a8a69		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2C6D0F 584266 bytes

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