RTF malware analysis — malicious · b0602ad06457022f

MALICIOUS

RTF

82.8 KB First seen: 2024-08-31

MD5: cd3b14daed16ebb53330abb3b7f41797 SHA-1: d373eeefcb54220692643d8b64449b33bc83a4dc SHA-256: b0602ad06457022f71fb83b47a2381eb119ad1f7e995d1e2144454b3f6604cdd

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The RTF document contains critical heuristics indicating the exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR). It also fires for OLE object data and automatic linking, suggesting the embedded object is designed to be activated. This activation likely leads to the download and execution of a secondary payload, a common technique for initial access.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000130b.bin` `580af4549f38414d1489a8360bc7887a8db4a1efc98c9599a5df0e62f4cf636d`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x130B	1700 bytes

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