Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b050878dae7b8005…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.7 KB Created: 2021-05-07 06:41:25 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-20
MD5: f238290b2e54475c074a938e20b2a225 SHA-1: d6446c19ba6fdd5b2f111afaf13266aec9e19684 SHA-256: b050878dae7b8005fb3b759b02bbac6d074dc565e2eca9140829d29bc2f8633a
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm or phishing attempt. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs point towards a tactic of redirecting users to potentially malicious content, likely for credential harvesting or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://jumiwimov.ru/strik?utm_term=ice+cream+roll+machine+amazon+india PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/tuwetebep/fr3Cfcz/96860919881.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/dagozuwemep/RrbGVha/fakiruriwerugimorinozuge.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/weluwexo/ghjgEij/54496081802.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kugefiruxat/bqelidE/fibovikile.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/bikuloxisage/g5ZPfks/32837367456.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kewesowovim/h4gf8nC/kizuputorijajitonib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wusirilunoko/cVsgdpd/aoe2_britons_guide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gaxasexafarud.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134590452/posuraguj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://misikozi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134443183/78ea1e8d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://regetun.22web.org/wexinu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://geguxawuxereko.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379712/3013f1937111.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vakolitakap/gh3CwFb/lynx_lake_recreation_area.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wazagidonux/cignal_play_app.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nopobakuso.epizy.com/fikamugedefipupeza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tasufagijaremo/sorataragegedenunitopib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wefefamerimido.rf.gd/canadian_math_kangaroo_2012_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ecbb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xECBB 4988 bytes
SHA-256: ceb9340bd142619304a43ec15fd2a5439c4cac2a5400ca1b183d1a2e6485deff
font_01_sfnt_off0000fd87.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFD87 12020 bytes
SHA-256: 55e5361cbafbdd81e002ff3e6024f5fed3971e1fbef502d92256f74246c5d7c8

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