Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b04dcff1a998ee89…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.7 KB Created: 2021-02-15 06:41:54 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: dd6f562c7d5e7e4d15a5b5eaab02e65e SHA-1: c00a0edd69504addcb93e950a52086ebe5f03584 SHA-256: b04dcff1a998ee892e478301949f9a44ca11065f03f317d7c3512da2a9177bc8
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, with critical heuristics indicating it acts as a redirector to known malicious infrastructure. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly support a malicious classification. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded links suggest an attempt to lead the user to a phishing or malware-hosting site, aligning with spearphishing attachment tactics.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://crophysi.ru/wb?keyword=aver%20media%20centre In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/rarirawibowo/coGggic/matchington_mansion_hack.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4417033/normal_6019c5aa2533d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4455380/normal_5fe885e92e2ee.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dizogesutupini.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134631076/tovulatupijeni.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vilotirupoj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135328316/cad1028cb023.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://stixlife.info/fidisawvssby.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fc-aromat.ru/lakavnsyxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://copyright-central-media.com/bojuvipisovoxupasoxowe6bcas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://smeshnoykir.space/aashto_roadside_design_guide_clear_zonejib9z.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://smm-target.ru/728987250404m8tf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rinuvigilositu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134463450/bupikusadij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4480382/normal_5ffd640f3cabd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://springwin.space/1297338010ea5vr.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wefupavoxed.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682659/09da3b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/nezusoxe/idEjhjd/43559146437.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zusevamasor/mekitizevoreroxivepurile.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d049.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD049 4756 bytes
SHA-256: d2779b64a0db60af4b7ced3f7127ddea226d3a3555ffcc3bb66eacbe78e5aa4f
font_01_sfnt_off0000e09f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE09F 4924 bytes
SHA-256: e7b4fc8f1810fa1a2425f8e52a0747b1aa22ea980d94cab3edaae4492e58e598
font_02_sfnt_off0000f14e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF14E 10716 bytes
SHA-256: 07158e1617ab70b14a7c6f01c3a4187a5374c9e754061c053a3c3cef9d428289

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