Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b04c5e2faebb16f0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

153.4 KB Created: 2022-07-27 10:46:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-07-27
MD5: a341ce71895d5a39c81299dd562a17ef SHA-1: 2342bfdd8ec90768b26a36bbb00e5347ce4eee69 SHA-256: b04c5e2faebb16f06088fafe8d1b29748c4d221062e8e57df78f9a822c537318
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: DLL Side-Loading

The file is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate that this OLE object is a package that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically identified as a '.jar' file. This suggests the document is a dropper for a secondary malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
321eb9478665fd502f2d7b0ed1b4e94a300f8da39bd9fa046a5cc72d4490fe65		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 129024 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.95, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
6ce481c3a1629a861c74c55c6a4d5d7e5cf52e232d961abe7c6d7336e5ee101a		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 125308 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.99, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
ad8d24068f633307f214521844ab19f7df6dd30425ec7714096dc5e4a920e47a		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5464 bytes

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