Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b03ee24844c71354…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

24.8 KB First seen: 2023-03-20
MD5: 67813a427b895283130f351eda676413 SHA-1: 7435c8fd33692e4de5c64d326c7979145eab8c52 SHA-256: b03ee24844c713545b3cbd37981db041423a1719d8d9faf596cdd8ddad7dc50f
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically identified as being related to Equation Editor. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening, bypassing user interaction for activation. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic to bypass macro security settings and trigger malicious content execution.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000492f.bin
c59be6679b4489a2abdf1cf767ee1689dc0c16601db92790dd98969359f3f0c8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x492F 1320 bytes