RTF malware analysis — malicious · b02e97be21b8c139

MALICIOUS

RTF

45.6 KB First seen: 2023-07-26

MD5: 2f290df5befcc831165d22ef011d29fb SHA-1: ea4364bd0d4711860c7d4b0ebfea6d9d4dad2ad1 SHA-256: b02e97be21b8c13924b999a9520fca882a3c4908d5cd86f236d9015ec349e2d6

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit technique. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the document includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing'. This combination strongly suggests an exploit targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability to deliver a malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000044a8.bin` `f450ef359c75178c874f5f7961cce338a6ca8aba3dd54ad6db5dda4bee21847d`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x44A8	2048 bytes

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