Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b02c63ab07027c4d…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

819.8 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 79c5f99b9d7145941c2d8113381230d7 SHA-1: 555eeefc065b3fc5afd020b332ff2467b465eae2 SHA-256: b02c63ab07027c4dae03f1375a0beb2a984692126bb5fa981fe8cf2d8dacc1aa
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The file is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. Critical heuristics indicate exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, a vulnerability in MSXML SAX OLE activation, which allows for arbitrary code execution. The presence of ".objupdate" further suggests that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was heavily obfuscated, but the core attack relies on the Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000c65b3.bin
e976d423cd3e7d763eb73fa9e63fc11ee693c4a9c6329b1250bf5cbe96e2490e		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC65B3 3739 bytes

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