RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · b02ad47d873d31a9

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

301.1 KB

MD5: b6c84d292a7ec7da6837b078fb5de861 SHA-1: 119c1573a1c76d2ce7b6b61c8749b9bf9164115f SHA-256: b02ad47d873d31a9cf8d15308f6ce7cb1a28cb51497d5f6f9773d20b583ac60b

182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link

The file is an RTF document that leverages the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability by embedding a malicious OLE object within the Equation Editor. This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The high entropy of the extracted artifact further supports the presence of an embedded executable.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED

RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001901.bin` `b3cbcdf67d54ebb6ad13866cc4673d008eeb7d72eab9174f4e8c3b6f0efd61d0`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1901	100429 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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