Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b00e7e7c3aeae863…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.7 KB Created: 2020-10-31 20:48:40 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-12-28
MD5: 06473350dde90714b465bdf45dd26b68 SHA-1: 7bdd4971f35837ff265e4e322071309acd888726 SHA-256: b00e7e7c3aeae863d6b2756a5d2c03305637315e9d02e5df7bef9997fc314fcd
192 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links pointing to external PDF files hosted on various domains, many of which appear to be disposable. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. While no scripts were extracted, the structure and link farm behavior suggest an attempt to manipulate search engine results or distribute further malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.link/123?keyword=reference+code+s0a00+time+warner In PDF document text
    • https://vabeliguteziji.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379360/bekexis-vikufojig-golifivop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kubupukadumu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131382740/8882364.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gimejexoxixaza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872185/kadupe_ripovu_jozovagazemewe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4423714/normal_5f98d63eed90d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nuvetifozeg.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134358797/3826134.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pigogokeda.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857695/03b622.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kurikezexiwu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775092/7754568.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://naxedomabaxa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606472/nadolekiv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4384483/normal_5f92e1141b090.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/2348/2530/files/napakipoxebeponimolowafa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0268/8303/1233/files/wifi_password_apk_master.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0266/8619/3841/files/category_6_day_of_destruction_part_2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/67876562-e120-4061-982f-830ddbe35eae/43289004462.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0501/0115/8051/files/aint_gonna_jump_no_more_cadence.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0483/9148/7640/files/yanet_garcia_boyfriend_cod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007058.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7058 5376 bytes
SHA-256: a70e0551448769a49e56091a735f83eea4cd5ec2776215a19fc8039776928aef
font_01_sfnt_off0000829e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x829E 10292 bytes
SHA-256: 0665b30ab6a3f0572a4ee22faafc258bc938ad421a459bad5001304e360af458

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.