Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 aff1d215a5850963…

MALICIOUS

PDF

30.8 KB Created: 2020-04-29 21:15:20 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.1.4 (via Qt 4.8.6)
MD5: e4db9849a5d88279700018387944d814 SHA-1: 21e54e40ee40ad19b9a6e919be6777c1726d3297 SHA-256: aff1d215a585096308cfd87f4cce8cf15fac683375bbef08c7c2190d9bb2eeab
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, identified by the PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic, pointing to various PDF documents hosted on different domains. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. This suggests the document is part of a link farm or SEO manipulation scheme, potentially distributing further malicious content or attempting to influence search engine rankings. The presence of embedded URLs and the sheer volume of external links are the primary indicators of malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://offplandubai.properties/uploads/1/3/0/2/130287842/130287842.html#lace+edged+sheet+sets
    • http://kvcllc.net/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453181/zavizi.pdf
    • http://amymariakidmohair.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813604/zotelebimirekonolidu.pdf
    • http://tigardhsdrowsy.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739597/zavuwika-zojabatote.pdf
    • http://ennellgroup.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398064/ziwepanoxoneg.pdf
    • http://alectvenstrup.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874639/soweganufulef.pdf
    • http://viamicro.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454383/ebcc36310d9652.pdf
    • http://soulsinfriendship.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739704/faxotuvabiv.pdf
    • http://popophobic.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130639518/9433843.pdf
    • http://truthhealsus.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873937/9492da82d46.pdf
    • http://rcmillwork.ca/uploads/1/3/0/4/130488512/520622.pdf
    • http://creativecapturesphotography.net/uploads/1/3/0/3/130323962/lisenesu.pdf
    • http://beautybeauspa.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637527/paxodudi_kewar.pdf
    • http://heavenlybell.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438416/1843a657eac19.pdf
    • http://barefootsup.us/uploads/1/3/0/6/130603822/6540495.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000507e.bin
e2247c42675bb50290b117ad8f02a814af74ed6bcbd475ec71831b5537bd567f		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x507E 7308 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.