Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 afd95f016ad31029…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.6 KB Created: 2021-06-18 12:22:53 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: c020bc746a8f0b80f32318a511f86a29 SHA-1: 656216f68814a1c4a897e3ddfbac9ab44cb8187d SHA-256: afd95f016ad31029dc397add30069c9922022a6c3b44066b54804db43cbf6906
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The sample is a PDF containing embedded JavaScript and a link farm pointing to multiple disposable hosting sites. This structure is indicative of a phishing or malware distribution campaign, likely attempting to trick users into downloading further malicious content. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly support its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://chcial.ru/uplcv?utm_term=usmle+step+1+2020+pdf+download
    • https://mollis.rs//files/vavibamiku.pdf
    • http://almar-bus.pl/userfiles/file/jonotu.pdf
    • https://www.mercedesbenzofaustinservice.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607b6dede94dc---tinugeribixibinikatix.pdf
    • http://www.akutrans.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160756e1be834b---kunadiji.pdf
    • http://sylvianapoles.com/clients/e/e6/e63d90d46a840f0b3195f531cec11f6e/File/pawizosajizasajizew.pdf
    • https://empezo.xyz/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/vavapajajafizejovijo.pdf
    • https://moniimpex.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16074dc364dbb6---wekunokawiluxinozeboz.pdf
    • https://suemsas.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1f2sruo8gctpsav6lhivi099q4/sojixezaruzupovabepuzel.pdf
    • http://progfin.pl/userfiles/file/31642966712.pdf
    • https://evenimentecastel.ro/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/eau56tlb7bu0agdvbdvmn902n8/rimisasikejolavapofupo.pdf
    • https://hartwellcook.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/437a302a153b55afdbb54504215bb186/65742932110.pdf
    • https://www.xcelsus.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16090ad440e737---puwukefesowagolifafeg.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dd09.bin
3a1502488e324b6ba1092f1b43c31b585c141acc93e493872d561bcc2662b5e8		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDD09 5500 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000efcd.bin
b883a015157bfaaf8cbaf38674cc4fb62504dba3ddaddce5b420ffe71ee8d422		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEFCD 13400 bytes

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